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Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamic relationship between hybrid media and hybrid
politics in Lebanon and Tunisia. While previous research on the media in hybrid
regimes has mainly focused on regime strategies of restricting and manipulating public
debate, our analysis moves beyond repression. We argue that the ambiguities of
hybrid politics, which combines democratic and authoritarian elements, not only con-
strain independent and critical reporting but also open up opportunities for journal-
istic agencies. We draw on Schedler’s concept of informational uncertainty to capture
the epistemological instability of hybrid regimes and the strategies of political actors
to control public knowledge. Distinguishing between three dimensions of media
hybridity - economic, cultural and technological - we show how the new hybrid
media environment significantly increases the volatility of hybrid politics and informa-
tional uncertainty for political actors. Our empirical analysis is based on seventy-one
semistructured interviews with journalists in Lebanon and Tunisia conducted
between 2016 and 2019. The material reveals a broad range of strategies used by
journalists who employ the internal contradictions of hybrid politics to pursue
their own agenda. The comparison between Lebanon and Tunisia also highlights con-
textual conditions that enable, or limit, journalistic agency, such as clientelistic depen-
dencies, economic resources, and civil society alliances.
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Hybridity has become one of the most salient concepts across a broad range of
disciplines. Originating in the life sciences, the term hybridity is now widely used in
the social sciences and humanities to come to grips with an increasingly complex envi-
ronment where well-established categories fail to describe newly emerging patterns of
social organization, practices, and identities (Chadwick 2017; Kraidy 2002).
In this paper, we employ the hybridity concept to examine the relationship between
media and politics in contexts outside the established liberal democracies of the West.
For our analysis, we draw on two strands of scholarship each of which has developed a
distinct understanding of hybridity: comparative politics on hybrid regimes on the one
hand and media and journalism studies on the other. Within the conceptual framework
of hybridity, we aim to develop a more nuanced understanding of the ambiguity of the
media–politics nexus that goes beyond the rather simplistic focus on censorship and
struggles for press freedom that has dominated both research and policymaking over
the past few decades (LaMay 2011; Simon 2014).
In comparative politics, the notion “hybrid regimes” has become a conceptual tool
to categorize political systems that are characterized by a juxtaposition of democratic
and authoritarian institutions and practices (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010;
Morlino 2009). Although more countries than ever call themselves democracies,
many of the democratic newcomers struggle to develop into full democracies, while
in other cases the transition got stalled in a hybrid state of neither–nor (Carothers
2002). Despite having adopted the main institutions of democratic rule, such as multi-
party elections, other essential elements, most notably rule of law, effective checks and
balances, and civil liberties, remain weak (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Jakli et al. 2019;
Merkel 2004).
Contemporary hybrid politics is embedded in, and interacts with, an environment of
unprecedented media abundance which itself is the result of a far-reaching process of
hybridization that has fundamentally transformed the way in which information is pro-
duced, disseminated, and consumed both globally and within nation states.
Accordingly, different sub-fields of communication scholarship have developed differ-
ent conceptualizations of hybridity to describe a rather diverse range of changes that
affect existing media institutions, journalistic practices, and communication technolo-
gies. We base our analysis on three particular aspects of media hybridity that are of
central importance for the understanding of the relationship of media and politics in
hybrid political contexts: economic hybridity, hybridity of journalistic culture, and
technological hybridity. Through the lens of these three dimensions, we examine the
dynamic interaction between hybrid politics and hybrid media: How do ownership
structures, journalistic cultures and the transformation of media platforms impact on
the ability of journalists and political elites to control public discourse?
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Method and Data
The article builds on empirical investigations of journalism in two countries from the
Arab world: Lebanon and Tunisia. Although these countries represent two different tra-
jectories of political development and are ranked on opposite sides of the democracy/
autocracy cut-off point, they are also similar with regard to particular constellations of
political and media hybridity. Lebanon has a long tradition of political pluralism and is
counted as a “hybrid regime” in the 2019 Democracy index (EIU Democracy Index
2019). Nominally democratic processes are stalled by elite arrangements whereby
each of the country’s major religious communities monopolizes certain key positions
(e.g., the president is a Maronite Christian, and the Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim)
while, internally, each community has been controlled by the same politicians and fam-
ilies for decades. Civil liberties are compromised and corruption is a growing problem.
Lebanese journalism has historically thrived on greater freedom of speech than what
was found in other Arab countries. It has played an active political role in the country’s
complex history, which, however, has made it a frequent target of outside influences
(Dajani 2019). Tunisia was until 2011 an authoritarian regime but entered a professed
transition to democracy following the Arab Uprisings. However, the country has been
facing obstacles in consolidating its achievements (Fassihian 2018) and is classified as
a “flawed democracy” in the 2019 Democracy index (EIU Democracy Index 2019).
Despite successful presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, the legacies of
authoritarianism continue to mark largely unreformed state sectors such as the judiciary
and the security apparatus, and there is evidence for the elites of the old regime to
re-emerge in political life (Wolf 2018). Extensive patronage networks coexist with
formal power structures and are responsible for endemic corruption that encompasses
all layers of society. Tunisian journalism does not have the history of political engage-
ment of its Lebanese counterpart but has blossomed, thanks to the post-2011 liberty of
expression. It continues to be torn between democratic ambitions and legacies of the
authoritarian past (Høigilt and Selvik 2020).
Our empirical analysis is based on seventy-one semistructured interviews with jour-
nalists, thirty-three in Lebanon, and thirty-eight in Tunisia, that were conducted during
several field trips to the two countries between 2016 and 2019. Starting with a set of
participants in major media outlets, we further expanded our sample by using snow-
balling. In the societies of Lebanon and Tunisia, personal connections are essential
for establishing trust and play also an important role in professional life. Snowball sam-
pling that employs personal recommendation is therefore an effective way of recruiting
study participants (Arksey and Knight 1999; Berger 2016). Throughout the process, we
monitored the composition of the sample and corrected biases where necessary. The
resulting sample includes journalists from different types of media, both traditional
and digital, and across the political and ideological spectrum, thus ensuring that all rel-
evant viewpoints and experiences are represented in the data. More than half of the par-
ticipants were experienced journalists at senior level whose insider knowledge was
particularly valuable. However, female journalists are underrepresented in our
sample despite our aim for a more balanced sample. This is probably an unintended
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effect of the snowballing approach and the fact that both field researchers are male. On
reviewing the interview material, we found no systematic differences related to the
gender of interviewees. (Details of the sample and the research instrument can be
found in the Supplementary Information file.) For the most part, the interviews
lasted between 30 and 60 min. They were conducted in Arabic and then transcribed
into English. The interview guide covered issues of journalists’ role perceptions and
their relationship with political power holders. The research is part of a project on
“Journalism in struggles for democracy: Media and polarization in the Middle East”
funded by the Research Council of Norway (principal investigator: Kjetil Selvik). In
this paper, we focus on segments of the interviews that reflect on the way in which jour-
nalists experience political manipulation and their own capacity to control information
flows.
The article is divided into two main sections. In the first section, we take a more
detailed look at the inner workings of hybrid regimes by focusing on the notion of
informational uncertainty suggested by Schedler (2013). Unlike most theories of
authoritarianism, Schedler’s approach systematically considers information dynamics
and the role of the media in hybrid politics and therefore proves particularly useful in
the context of our analysis. In the second part of the paper, we analyze the above-
mentioned three major dimensions of media hybridity and their interdependence
with hybrid politics in the light of the experience of journalists in Lebanon and
Tunisia, countries that have received limited attention in media and communication
research so far (but see Chouikha 2013; El Issawi 2016; El-Richani 2016;
Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2012).
Hybrid Regimes and the Politics of Uncertainty
The juxtaposition of democratic and nondemocratic elements in hybrid regimes results
in a multiplicity of frictions and structural contradictions that have the potential to
destabilize the regime. According to Schedler (2013), these incongruities generate
an environment of pervasive uncertainty which, he argues, is a defining feature of
hybrid politics. Schedler identifies two distinct, yet interrelated dimensions of uncer-
tainty: institutional and informational. The main source of institutional uncertainty
is multiparty elections and the resulting competition between different contenders.
While elections are vital to provide the regime with legitimacy, their outcome and con-
sequences are fundamentally unpredictable. Since in hybrid regimes commitment to
democratic rules of the game is largely instrumental, elections are frequently fought
out as zero-sum games on the assumption that if losing there might not be another
chance to win back majorities in the future.
The toleration of a certain degree of electoral competition opens up a space of public
debate beyond the tightly defined government agenda, which characterizes authoritar-
ian regimes. This discursive pluralism is the source of informational uncertainty, as
issues, frames, and narratives can take unexpected turns and be exploited by different
groups in the power struggle. Controlling public knowledge is therefore a vital part of
the regime to maintain existing power arrangements. However, outright suppression of
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deviant voices is a risky strategy because it undermines the regime’s claim of being
democratic and would therefore invite popular resistance. Instead, to manage informa-
tional uncertainty hybrid regimes use a more indirect “menu of manipulation”
(Schedler 2002). One particularly effective mechanism to silence critical voices—jour-
nalists, activists, or critics within the system—is the selective use of the law, such as
libel and defamation laws, while at the same time the appearance of legality is main-
tained. The effect of this strategy of “legal repression” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 9) is a
pervasive ambiguity as to where exactly the boundaries of tolerated speech are and
what the potential consequences are of any transgression. Another strategy involves
building a firm “cordon sanitaire” around the inner workings of political decision
making—who is responsible for which decisions and how resources are allocated—
thus blurring transparency and preventing a meaningful public debate to hold power
holders to account.
While uncertainty works primarily as a constraint that permeates the institutional
and epistemic workings of hybrid politics, it is also a strategic tool for all actors
involved in the political struggle, as they aim to minimize uncertainty for themselves
and to maximize it for their opponents. This also applies to the media as key knowledge
brokers in public communication. On the one hand, they are subjected to numerous
restrictions and manipulations by political and economic actors as to which and how
news items are covered. On the other hand, the ambiguities of hybrid politics open
up opportunities for journalists to play an active part in the “uncertainty game.” For
sure, media cannot change political reality. But they can change the perception of polit-
ical reality of both citizens and elites, which has been shown to alter individual and
collective decision making (Chong and Druckman 2007). Thus, challenging the
boundaries around sensitive issues or reframing the narratives that legitimize the
status quo has the potential to mobilize public opinion and fuel demands for change.
Moreover, new issue agendas can trigger a reconfiguration of elite coalitions or
invite the emergence of new actors, which might destabilize existing arrangements
of power sharing.
The dynamics of informational uncertainty in hybrid regimes differ from both
authoritarian and democratic contexts in significant ways. In authoritarian regimes,
strict censorship monopolizes information control at the centers of power, while in
democracies competition over the public agenda is played out on a level-playing
field across a broad range of actors. Hybrid regimes, by contrast, tolerate a certain
degree of pluralism, but the rules of the game are ambiguous and can be shifted in
either direction at any time, thereby imposing a constant state of uncertainty on jour-
nalists who are taking high risks when stepping outside the official discourse.
Meanwhile, for political actors coping with informational uncertainty involves more
than coping with unexpected agenda shifts. Since in hybrid regimes the regime ques-
tion is not finally settled—neither in favor of a liberal democracy nor in favor of an
authoritarian order—political conflicts over day-to-day political issues can quickly
turn into conflicts over the legitimacy of the regime itself. These internal contradictions
of hybridity apply to both countries of our study, albeit to varying degrees, as the fol-
lowing analysis demonstrates.
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Media Hybridity: Dimensions and Cases
Unlike the concept of “hybrid regime” that has a well-defined focus in comparative
politics—even though the boundaries and empirical evidence are disputed (see
Bernhagen 2019; Varieties of Democracy, n.d.)—in media and communication
studies, the notion of hybridity takes on different meanings, which makes it difficult
to arrive at a unified definition of media hybridity. Arguably, different media hybrid-
ities exist side-by-side owing to the multiple faces of what we mean by “media”: social
institution, cultural product, technologies, etc. Three dimensions of media hybridity are
of particular relevance in the context of the present paper, each of them influencing
journalistic practices and their impact on the level and distribution of informational
uncertainty in hybrid regimes.
First, on an institutional level, we can expect hybrid regimes to bring about hybrid
media systems that reflect the specific structural and normative ambiguities of the polit-
ical systems in which they are embedded (Voltmer 2012). This argument follows
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) approach to comparative media studies who argue that
the institutional structures of western media systems, such as regulation and ownership,
are largely congruent with the institutional design of the political systems in which the
media operate. However, due to the assemblage of democratic and authoritarian logics,
it can be assumed that the politics–media nexus in hybrid regimes is particularly prone
to incongruences that have the potential to increase informational uncertainty.
Second, while institutional factors set external rules for the working of journalism,
journalistic culture constitutes the internal rules that define what “good journalism” is,
that is the norms by which the quality of its products is evaluated. According to
Hanitzsch (2007), journalistic culture incorporates the professional worldviews of jour-
nalists that define how they perceive their role with regard to both political power and
their audience. While the globalization of the media industry is a driving force for the
homogenization of journalistic products, local cultures and the divergence of political
regimes suggest diversification of journalistic cultures and the values and practices
involved in the production of news.
Finally, Chadwick’s (2017) analysis of the “hybrid media system” takes a very dif-
ferent approach. Chadwick developed his theory of hybridity from a technological per-
spective and analyses how the digital revolution of the past few decades has
transformed the way in which power is exercised in modern societies. He argues
that in the new hybrid media system the distinction between “old” and “new” media
has become meaningless, as online and offline media, traditional and digital media con-
verge into a largely overlapping sphere of meaning construction where messages are
produced and controlled by a growing number of both professional and nonprofes-
sional gatekeepers. As a result, the emerging hybrid media system presents an assem-
blage of different media logics, thereby creating a new “media ecology” (Scolari 2012)
that incorporates new actors, new practices of message production, and new avenues of
information flows beyond the elite-dominated system of traditional mass media, which
has been the cornerstone of information control in traditional authoritarian regimes.
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In the following, we explore these three aspects of media hybridity in the context of
hybrid politics, using evidence from Lebanon and Tunisia to demonstrate how the
interdependence between political actors and media actors creates for both parts spe-
cific constellations of uncertainty and opportunities to control it.
Economic Hybridity. The often assumed link between media independence and private
ownership rarely materializes in transitional and hybrid contexts. Rather, political elites
use private media ownership as an effective resource to control the public agenda
without exposing themselves as censors (Dragomir 2018). Frequently, media outlets
and licenses are not given to the most competent and economically viable bidder,
but to close allies of the ruling elite and even family members to ensure that media cov-
erage does not cross the “red lines” of tolerable content. Media ownership as an instru-
ment to buy and reward loyalty has led to a specific form of media crony capitalism
where media owners and editors are closely entangled with the political class (see
Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002; Hughes and Lawson 2005; Roudakova 2017).
In the two countries of our study, we see similar patterns as described by these
authors, but also the unintended consequences of politicized ownership.
In Lebanon, several of the most important media conglomerates or television chan-
nels are owned by individuals with a leading position in one of the politico-religious
groups on which Lebanon’s consociational political system is built. The clearest
example is al-Manar TV and website, which is a mouthpiece for Hizbullah and
enjoys very little editorial freedom. Further, Future Media Group, owned by Saad
Hariri, is the main media outlet associated with the Sunni elite, while OTV is owned
by supporters of Lebanon’s Maronite President Michel Aoun. Thus, the media owner-
ship structure reflects and stabilizes the existing balance of power and constrains jour-
nalistic agency as notions of the congruence between political and media institutions
would suggest.
Due to the competition among the elites who share power, news coverage is rarely
uniform across the channels, as it would be under a unitary authoritarian regime. Even
though these competing agendas that emerge from different segments of the media
system remain largely within the established boundaries of power sharing, the resulting
pluralism is like the proverbial genie in the bottle who once released cannot be con-
trolled anymore.
Politicized ownership not only leads to a deeply fragmented media landscape but
also to an often toxic polarization between societal segments. This happens when
media owners use their outlets to launch smear campaigns against political opponents
or business competitors (Sakr et al. 2015). Even though this often brings up hidden
information about dubious business practices and corruption, the resulting watchdog
journalism is a highly skewed form of investigative reporting where the truth is fre-
quently sacrificed for personal gains (Waisbord 2000).
Yet the hybridity of private ownership also opens up unexpected degrees of
freedom. Given sufficient economic resources and political savviness, some media
owners may choose—for profit or other reasons—to detach themselves from the exist-
ing arrangements by encouraging the media they own to engage in critical coverage
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even if it disregards the political fault lines. This is the case with Pierre Daher and
Tahsin Khayyat, owners of the popular Lebanese TV channels LBCI and New TV,
respectively. They have branded their channels as counter-currents to the system of
sectarian power sharing, which has earned them a large viewership. As part of this
strategy, they pursue an editorial policy of giving civil society actors a voice, as a
program director at New TV stated when interviewed about the parliamentary elections
in 2018:
We had an ambition in our channel, which supports civil society: if civil society
could manage to unite in a single list, we were prepared to support them with TV
coverage, campaign posters etc. That did not happen, but we support individual can-
didates, having them speak on TV without paying and even advertisements compa-
nies supporting them for free. (Interview with TV journalist, Beirut, 3 May 2018)
The fact that the channel gave airtime to civil society actors without charging them is
noteworthy. In Lebanon, a significant part of a TV channel’s income is the money it
charges for airtime given to political actors, especially during elections. Given the
price for a half-hour interview between US$30,000 and US$60,000 (European
Union Election Observation Mission 2018), forgoing this money amounts to substan-
tial support for a cause outside the established power structure.
In Tunisia, the media’s political affiliations are less transparent than in Lebanon but
no less real for that. As testified by journalists interviewed, both private and public
media are subject to recurrent instrumentalization—be it by parts of the government
in the case of public media, or by powerful businessmen with vested interests in politics
in the private media. The controversies surrounding the TV channel Nessma are an
instructive example. This channel is controlled by the businessman Nabil Karoui,
who actively supported Beji Caid Essebsi’s successful bid to become president.
Later, Karoui used the channel to support his own political career. In 2017, he
started the daily program “Khalil Tunis,” which covered the activities of his charity
organization of the same name. The program showed Karoui and volunteers of the
charity distributing food, clothes, and other essentials to poor people in Tunisia’s
many marginalized regions, earning him wide support in the country. As Nessma
aired daily footage of Karoui distributing Ramadan meals to the poor in May 2019,
he gave an interview to the channel where he announced his intention to run for
President in the elections later that year. Karoui has also been caught on tape instruct-
ing Nessma’s journalists to fabricate negative news about a Tunisian NGO that accused
him of tax evasion.
At the same time—and contrary to Lebanon—Tunisian journalists operate within a
more regulated framework while enjoying the support of civil society organizations.
Several factors contribute to this particular situation: First, the Tunisian revolution
resulted in a sustained effort to reform and regulate the media sector (El Issawi
2016: 16–21). The most notable achievement is the High Independent Authority of
Audiovisual Communication, which has proven to be able and willing to enforce exist-
ing regulations, for example by penalizing violations of election campaign coverage
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regulations. Second, the Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens organizes dem-
onstrations and strikes to protest against harassment by the security sector and poor
working conditions of journalists. Third, Tunisian journalists and civil society
NGOs regularly cooperate to improve the quality of political reporting. For
example, the organization al-Bawsala (Compass) provides training and counseling
for journalists who cover parliamentary affairs (Interview with al-Bawsala official,
Tunis, 4 May 2018). These support structures contribute to the quality of political jour-
nalism and help to develop resilience against economic and political manipulation.
Cultural Hybridity. Media system theorists have associated certain models of journalism
with particular regime types (Siebert et al. 1963) or varieties of democracy (Hallin and
Mancini 2004). However, comparative research has revealed large variations of jour-
nalistic cultures both within and across countries, even though professional journalism
and its main product—news—remains clearly recognizable as such (Hanitzsch and
Donsbach 2012). Mellado et al. (2017) found a multiplicity of “hybrid journalisms”
that mix and match elements of different ethics and styles of journalism.
Our empirical research confirms the juxtaposition of different journalisms within a
hybrid political environment. In Lebanon, the fragmentation of the media system along
sectarian lines is reflected by the prevalence of a journalism of “views” rather than
“news” (Dajani 2019). However, there are also journalists who oppose this culture
and adhere to different norms and practices. Three main role perceptions stand out
in our interview material and affect the kind and level of informational uncertainty
in different ways. First, there is a group of “loyal interventionists” or “advocates” of
a particular elite group (Hanitzsch 2007: 372–3). Their professional role is often deter-
mined by political convictions and their willingness to attack rival factions (Dabbous
2010). Paradoxically perhaps, this role may enhance the public significance of journal-
ists because they are seen as the public voice for this or that elite player. As one jour-
nalist said:
For this reason, when you want to know what’s going on in the country, you don’t
listen to the politicians, you listen to the journalists. (Interview with TV journalist,
Beirut, 30 January 2018)
The second group is characterized by a more transactional journalistic culture.
Journalists of this kind are potentially “for hire” but do not see the implicit contract
with the political elite as absolute. On the contrary, they may curry favor with
several rival patrons in parallel and even play them against each other. By way of illus-
tration, a popular writer in Beirut interchangeably works for different and competing
Sunni Muslim politicians. This strategy increases his room for maneuver because if
relations sour with one patron he may switch to another (Interview with e-journalist,
Beirut, 4 March 2019). For politicians, these journalists represent a threat because
the information they collect may fall into the wrong hands. A corrupt politician
knows that if a journalist has dug up some dirt on him, he may be able to prevent
this information to be published in media controlled by his own sectarian group, but
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not from being shared across other media outlets hostile to the politician or through
online platforms outside formal media organizations. As a Lebanese journalist put it:
There are so many media outlets in Lebanon that you cannot control all of them with
money (…) They are never able to unite on a common interest. One has an interest
in exposing some instances of corruption, another pays attention to others. This var-
iation is what creates our liberty in Lebanon. (Interview with print media journalist,
Beirut, 29 January 2018)
The third group self-identifies as “change agents” and challenges the rules of sectarian
partisanship altogether. As Hanitzsch (2007: 373) finds, some journalists are eager to
adopt a more adversarial role that “openly challenges the powers that be.” This will not
only satisfy their own ideals and professionalism but will also earn them reputation and
credibility both among their audience and among their peers. This is because indepen-
dent journalism has a significant market value in societies where large parts of the pop-
ulation, in particular the younger generation, have grown tired of the rituals of sectarian
politics. In Lebanon, the two TV channels LBCI and New TV have become hubs of
independent journalism, which coexist with the political agendas of their owners.
For example, during the so-called “You Stink” crisis in 2015, when mass protests
erupted in Beirut because Lebanon’s political system was unable to deal with the
simple and fundamental task of collecting the garbage, New TV monitored the mobi-
lization online and offline and produced coverage that was very embarrassing to the
authorities (Battah 2015). By stepping outside the ties with established political
forces, these journalists see themselves as acting in the interest of the citizens and
their right to know and to be heard. As a senior reporter in New TV put it:
We were with the protestors and we really worked with them. The whole country
was filled with garbage and we were staunchly opposed to that. We live-streamed
the protests all the day. It was always at the top of our agenda. We were even
accused of instigating the protests. (Interview with TV journalist, Beirut, 1 June
2016)
This coverage of popular protests expanded the scope of pluralism beyond the set
agendas of the ruling elites who suddenly saw themselves taken to account for their
(lack of) actions. The fact that at one point, one of LBCI’s reporters was assailed by
security forces while covering the protests clearly illustrates the threat this poses to
ruling classes.
In Tunisia, the shift from traditional authoritarianism to the hybrid politics of tran-
sition has been accompanied by the rise to prominence of a new category of journalist-
commentators, known as chroniqueurs. They fill the screen and air of, especially,
private TV and radio stations with opinion and analysis. The chroniqueurs take the
lead in the public interpretation of contentious events, debating with guests and offer-
ing entertainment by turning up the heat in political talk shows (Interview with TV
journalist, Tunis, 8 April 2016). From a producer’s perspective, it is essential that
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the chroniqueurs are critical and outspoken for the sake of attracting viewers. This
increases their political influence and raises potential challenges for the decision-
makers. A chroniqueur we interviewed insisted that “every time I present my
program, nobody knows what I am going to say” (Interview with TV journalist,
Tunis, 3 May 2018). Other interviewees affirmed that politicians and businessmen
have commentators on their payroll (Interview with a freelance journalist, Tunis, 10
October 2019 and an e-media journalist, Tunis, 9 March 2019). Obviously, hiring a
hard-hitting commentator is a way for powerful actors to protect themselves from
media-driven attacks.
The funders expect the opinion leaders to defend their political agendas. But
since their rivals pursue the same strategy, communication becomes an ever-more
important part of the political game and the journalist-commentators’ market value
increases. These developments come with opportunities for journalists to make pro-
fessional choices. We found that in both Lebanon and Tunisia, prominent media
professionals are able to shop around to secure the highest possible degree of inde-
pendence for their own work. Experienced journalists who have made a name for
themselves can leave one media outlet for another once the margin of freedom
becomes unacceptably narrow for them (Interview with a journalist and chroni-
queur, Tunis, 7 April 2016). “Shopping around” is a luxury only a minority can
afford, however. For most Tunisian journalists, the fear of losing one’s job is
the Achilles heel that political actors can use against them. The private media
sector offers only temporary contracts and the average salary level is low. As a
consequence, journalists who struggle to make ends meet are vulnerable to corrup-
tion. To escape the economic constraints of the media industry, some journalists
have developed separate sources of income to protect their professional integrity.
There is indeed a category of “journalist-businessman” in both Lebanon and
Tunisia, which adds to the professional hybridity of journalistic cultures. A
well-off Tunisian entrepreneur and journalist explained the advantage of his busi-
ness activity:
You need an alternative to become independent. I am lucky because I have an alter-
native. I run companies. I can express my agreement or disagreement. (Interview
with TV journalist, Tunis, 20 November 2018)
Technological Hybridity. New digital communication technologies have fundamen-
tally reshaped the way in which knowledge is produced, disseminated, and con-
sumed. They are also transforming the power relationship between political
authorities and journalists in hybrid regimes whose stability and legitimacy cru-
cially depend on the effective control of information. The proliferation of channels
has not only dramatically expanded the level of pluralism in the public arena, but
digital technologies are also a powerful resource for collective action, as they
enable citizens to share ideas and act in a concerted manner even though they
are largely excluded from access to the mainstream media (Bennett and
Segerberg 2013). While governments struggle to adapt to the new “hybrid media
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system” (Chadwick 2017), traditional media are also losing their leading role as
major brokers of public information, as audiences, especially the younger genera-
tion, are turning to online platforms for political news and entertainment. Some
authors have even predicted the “end of journalism” as we know it (Hirst 2011;
Picard 2014). In any case, the end of elite-controlled mass communication as the
predominant mode of public communication suggests a wide-ranging
re-distribution of informational uncertainty, as more players are able to promote
alternative narratives through a multitude of channels.
However, the picture is more complex than that, as both journalists and political
elites are adapting to the new environment. Our research in Lebanon and Tunisia
shows that many journalists have bridged the boundaries between “new” and “old”
media spheres and use the potential of the emerging “hybrid media system” to over-
come existing restrictions and to (re)ascertain their own political significance.
Operating across online and offline media platforms has brought about new hybrid
forms of journalism combining traditional formats and styles, such as breaking news
and factuality, with emerging online roles that emphasize commentary and ordinary
everyday language (Chadwick 2017: 184–216). High-profile journalists such as
Dima Sadek or Hussein Mortada have hundreds of thousands of followers on
Twitter and their accounts serve as sites of hard-hitting commentary. With the diversi-
fication of roles, the boundaries between who is a journalist and who is not become
increasingly blurred. Several of the media professionals we interviewed in Lebanon
were even hesitant to call themselves “journalists,” since they are not employed as
political reporters. However, as successful current affairs bloggers and/or radio
program hosts they have gained considerable influence as interpreters of the political
events that are going on at local and national levels. The formats they use to
interact with the public—blogs, public Facebook pages, Twitter, and radio talk
shows—open up new spaces for innovative strategies for voicing criticism while
avoiding repression. A particularly striking example is a Lebanese Salafi (ultraconser-
vative Muslim) self-styled “media man” who has his own popular radio show, website,
Facebook, Twitter accounts, and WhatsApp group, all of which he uses extensively to
interact with the public. He sees himself as a “mediator,” both in the sense that he
explains politics to people and that he intervenes in social affairs, raising money for
the needy, for example. This figure has taken a deliberate choice to blend his private
and public face to reach out to people:
There are things that I don’t do as a journalist and others I don’t do as an indi-
vidual. But I do try to combine my two roles. For example, I am spontaneous
when I present my programmes. I don’t adopt a special style. I use humour
to talk about serious topics. (Interview with radio and online journalist,
Tripoli, 7 May 2018)
Moreover, the new hybrid media ecology has brought about new forms of media
organizations that oscillate between online and offline activities, journalism, and
political activism. In Tunisia, the website Nawaat was originally a blog for
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opposition activists. After the revolution, it registered as an NGO, put in place a
proper editorial structure, and hired professional journalists, so that it now functions
as a media outlet. It also joined forces with Wikileaks and published leaked informa-
tion pertaining to Tunisia for a Tunisian audience, and currently, it cooperates with
the above-mentioned NGO al-Bawsala (The Compass), which monitors the Tunisian
parliament and trains journalists to cover political affairs. A senior staff member
explained its function:
The NGOs that work to improve the state’s accountability help each other. We
provide publicity [to them]. They alert us about things that happen and we rely
on them in the quest for information. (Interview with e-journalist, Tunis, 8 March
2018)
The low cost of internet-only production and the hybrid structure of Nawaat have
enabled it to survive as one of Tunisia’s few truly independent and influential
voices. With its history and activities, Nawaat is a hybrid between whistleblower
NGO, professional media outlet, and oppositional website, a combination that has
made it a constant source of potentially damaging information for Tunisian political
elites and the media owners who are part of that elite. A crucial question here is,
however, the robustness of such new and independent media formats. In the
context of hybrid politics, the business model of organizations such as Nawaat
remains a political weakness that can be easily exploited. Since Nawaat is dependent
on support from Western NGOs and other civil society donors, it is vulnerable to
charges of serving foreign (and implicitly: sinister) agendas, an accusation fre-
quently utilized by established elites to undermine its credibility (Gallien and
Werenfels 2019).
However, the internet is no longer the exclusive domain of critical voices and has
become a highly contested arena where the struggle for discursive dominance is
fought out. Instead of suppressing information—the authoritarian option of reducing
information uncertainty—politicians and business people with vested political interests
are developing increasingly sophisticated ways of manipulating online communica-
tion, often by increasing the volume of information rather than restraining it.
Manufactured messages, disinformation, and rumors are churned out in large quantities
by trolls with the aim to spread confusion and mistrust among online communities
(Diamond and Whittington 2019). Social media manipulation may also directly
target journalists. In Lebanon, once a journalist acquires a reputation for taking on
the powers that be, s/he faces the risk of becoming the subject of electronic defamation
campaigns. In these cases, social media is used by powerful politicians and business-
men who have the resources to employ information mercenaries on social media plat-
forms to incite public opinion against the journalist in question. Today, journalists no
longer fear a knock on the door by the security agencies, but the wrath of the masses,
whipped up by professional manipulators who exploit the digital domain to full effect.
As an investigative journalist in Lebanon sighed:
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Imagine that, when I have investigated, exposed and covered corruption, I worry
about the flood of insults that will come from ordinary people! (Interview with
TV journalist, Beirut, 6 March 2019)
Conclusion
Hybridity is a ubiquitous phenomenon that has fundamentally transformed institutions,
practices, and discourses of modern societies. In this article, we explored the dynamics
of different forms of hybridity and their consequences for the relationship between
political power and the media in the Arab world. Contrary to fully authoritarian
regimes, the juxtaposition of democratic and nondemocratic politics in hybrid
regimes opens up numerous opportunities for journalistic agency to shape the political
agenda and to push existing boundaries of public communication.
In our analysis, we drew on Schedler’s (2013) concept of informational uncertainty
to investigate the complex media–politics nexus in hybrid contexts. From this perspec-
tive, the relationship between journalists and political power holders can be understood
as a struggle over uncertainty: How and by whom information is used to decrease
uncertainty for oneself and increase it for others. Our qualitative interviews with jour-
nalists in Lebanon and Tunisia show that the emerging multiple hybridities of the
media have made the “uncertainty game” for both players—politicians and journal-
ists—even less predictable, frequently resulting in unintended consequences for the
ecology of public knowledge.
Media ownership remains one of the most effective means in the hands of political
elites to control uncertainty arising from unrestricted public discourse. However, in
both Lebanon and Tunisia, the political economy of the media has brought about
hybrid structures of ownership where political, economic, and media power converge.
In particular in Lebanon, clientelistic arrangements and “political parallelism” have
locked the media into economic and political dependencies with limited space for jour-
nalistic initiatives. At the same time, intra-elite competition has generated a form of
competitive pluralism that allows journalists to engage in investigative activities that
increase the level of uncertainty for political elites, as none of the competing factions
is able to control the flow of information as a whole. The emergence of media outlets
that go against the mainstream further intensifies the “uncertainty game,” as they chal-
lenge the elite consensus of acceptable issues and provide opportunities for whistle-
blowers. However, for most media outlets, economic constraints resulting from
limited advertising revenues and shrinking audiences prevent this to be a viable option.
For western observers, the hybridization of journalistic cultures often appears as
deviance from recognized professional norms, as it incorporates a range of journalistic
practices that are informed by considerations external to “media logic.” However,
hybrid journalistic practices can be seen as a strategy to navigate a volatile political
landscape where the rules of the game are kept deliberately ambiguous to enforce
self-censorship.
Our interview material suggests that many journalists play a double game of subser-
vience and defiance, between a loyal-facilitator role and a watchdog role often couched
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in ambiguous language to protect themselves against persecution. In many cases, jour-
nalists manage to do both, taking on an ambiguous position that allows them to con-
stantly test the boundaries of public discourse and push them wherever frictions or
realignments in the political landscape appear, but to withdraw whenever political pres-
sure becomes too threatening. Some journalists have become remarkably skillful in
playing the elites against each other to their own benefit. Others have chosen to act
as the voice of ordinary citizens, earning them respect and stature among large seg-
ments of the population, which in some cases even turns out as economically benefi-
cial. The consequence of the multiplicity of roles journalists can adopt (individually or
collectively) is that it makes it more difficult for political elites to interact with journal-
ists and to predict the response their actions or statements might elicit in news coverage
and commentary.
Finally, new communication technologies have become one of the most dynamic
forces to reconfigure control over informational uncertainty in hybrid regimes. The
new “network media logic” of communication (Klinger and Svensson 2015) has
enabled journalists to expand the repertoire and scope of public engagement, combining
professional, institution-based journalism with new forms of commentary and investiga-
tion that are shared by and tailored around the affordances of digital networks. In addi-
tion, the possibility of building relatively low-cost digital news sites allows journalists to
wrest back control from the powerful alliances of media owners and politicians that char-
acterize many hybrid regimes. Unlike investigative campaigns as a political or economic
weapon in the hand of powerful media owners, these emerging news sites do have the
potential to break through the “cordon sanitaire” of secrecy that protects the inner
circles of power. However, the extent to which technologies empower independent jour-
nalism depends on the offline context in which digital action is embedded, as the com-
parison between Tunisia with its supportive civil society sector and Lebanon with its
entrenched clientelism shows. But the tables are turning again. After having ignored
online media as the domain of a small group of young privileged, urban mavericks, polit-
ical actors have developed an increasingly sophisticated arsenal of countermeasures to
manage the new tide of uncertainty. Moving beyond crude censorship, they have now
turned to proactive, invasive strategies of manipulating messages and controlling com-
munication flow in digital networks (Gunitsky 2015).
To sum up, in this paper, we have made the case for a new understanding of the
media’s role under hybrid politics, which emphasizes journalists as active participants
in the struggle over informational uncertainty. Rulers may well use the media as one of
several tools in their “menu of manipulation,” but as our two case studies suggest, the
hybridization of journalistic repertoires and the digital expansion of communicative
spaces and genres further intensifies the internal contradictions of hybrid regimes, as
they navigate between democratic opening and authoritarian suppression of public
communication.
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Notes
1. The authors are grateful to Sara Merabti Elgvin and Khaled Zaza for assistance on this
research project.
2. While writing, Future TV closed down due to economic problems. It currently continues as
a digital news site, including some web-TV content.
3. LBCI, “Live on Air during Her Coverage of ‘You Stink’: LBC’s Reporter is Assaulted
(in Arabic),” LBCI, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIJq9esyrIs.
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